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Southwest Airlines Captain Of Flight 345 Took Command Before NY Accident: NTSB

eklendi
 
(If this is a duplicate, I apologize). "NEW YORK -- The captain of a Southwest Airlines plane that landed on a collapsing nose gear at LaGuardia Airport took control from the first officer just 400 feet from the ground, the National Transportation Safety Board said Tuesday." (www.huffingtonpost.com) Daha Fazlası...

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dtw757
mike SUT 4
A Question then, Captain Duggan. Are you saying that you as PIC would "mentor" a FO in a rapidly deteriorating situation such as was occurring on that flight deck? Seems to me that trying to talk someone through stick and rudder movements in a jet that eventually struck hard enough, in a nose down attitude, hard enough to drive the gear through the E&E compartment is the wrong approach. If you cant "fathom" the situation where that can occur, maybe you are in the wrong profession. In eight years of military flying, 28 years of flying for a major airline, I have seen 1 occasion of the captain taking command in such a situation and have taken command of the aircraft myself when the situation demanded, repeat demanded, I do so. There was NO time for "gentle guidance" as you put it. However. until the actual cause comes out...I'll just address my concerns to your critical thinking skills and ask you, for your passengers sake, if the situation demands, take control, debrief the FO over a cup of coffee or a beer and let him/her take the rest of the legs as a symbol of trust.
preacher1
preacher1 3
He's just like the rest of us. We haven't been in a situation that would require us to take back control at 400'; to boot in this situation, NTSB says nose was up and all appeared normal. Captain took over, landing went to hell. His "can't fathom" is just a term to describe how incredulous the situation is. At least that's how I took it. I don't think any long term Captain would do anything to purposely endanger their pax, but this all begs a good explanation.
tduggan2010
Tim Duggan 3
mike SUT, thanks for the question. Someone (gearup328) beat me to the answer. But, it is the correct answer. An unstabilized approach should never be allowed to continue into an unsafe and uncomfortable situation. This is a general "truth" and it is too early to know for certain if this was the case with SWA 345.

I should have been more precise in my language....it is difficult to not be misunderstood sometimes, in this sort of venue.

What I was trying to say was, "taking control" should have been a response only in a dire emergency situation. What I tried to point out was that a competent pilot (CA) should have seen the situation developing WELL before that point where the CA decided to grab the airplane. There was time, much earlier in the approach set-up, when advice could have been given in order to have avoided this mess. By the time it looked "that bad" to the CA, then the proper action is a GA. (we don't do enough GAs, and I've seen pilots freeze when faced with one unexpectedly, because they have a brain fart). It's odd, because it is really simple, but some people are intimidated.

BTW, I've got about the same airline (major) as you, but not the military background.
gearup328
Peter Steitz 1
Tim, you hit the nail on the head!!
tduggan2010
Tim Duggan 1
Thank you. I think that you "got it" as well.
THRUSTT
THRUSTT 1
Yeah, but the initial report said it didn't go to hell until the Captain took over though. I am speculating here, but if you look at the initial reports it seemed like maybe the SWA profile coupled with that particular app/runway was making her uncomfortable...
You're right about sometimes there's no room for gentle guidance, it doesn't seem like guidance was needed here...
gearup328
Peter Steitz 1
No sir. The command in a rapidly deteriorating situation is "GO AROUND"!!!!
gearup328
Peter Steitz 1
BTW, this command can come from either seat. Once it is given, there's no looking back. A video I show in class is "It's OK to go around". We had an incident at Republic Airways with an ERJ-170 at CLE. The crew made 21 errors on the approach but the clincher was the PF FO over riding the Captain's order to go missed. The Captain said in a non-commanding tone "I think we should go". The FO said no and continued. The result was landing half way down the runway, in blinding snow and rolling off the end. Fortunately, no one was injured.
tduggan2010
Tim Duggan 2
gearup328, This is a perfect example, thanks for sharing. There are so many instances for training in a simulator environment, for just such cases.

One of my favorite Sim training experiences was when the Instructor whispered into my ear to have a subtle impairment...this while I, in the left seat, was 'PF', just to see the 'PM' reaction during a takeoff in snowy and slippery runway conditions.

I think the Simulator is under-used (and, I realize why...the curriculum at most airlines dictates the protocols).

In ALL situations, it still comes down to CRM, and the aspect of good communication.

Much can be learnt in the simulator. Because, it is a ;earning tool, with no jeopardy.
gearup328
Peter Steitz 1
Great training example. I don't know who you are but we are on the same page. Training, training, training is the answer. Human interface. Working together. I know in the "old days" we learned from another pilot. I was #2 in the formation. I followed lead. He lead the way. Now, the sophisticated cockpits require much more. There are two or more of you. Each has a say in what is going on. Speak up. Don't just fly into the ground without telling the PF that he is screwing up!!!!
Yours is a great example.
tduggan2010
Tim Duggan 4
I'm not prone to post a "first comment" on my own squawk...and, if this is a repeat, then please fold it into the other thread.

Just wanted to say, based on my experience as a line pilot, I cannot fathom a situation where the FO is the Flying Pilot ('FP'), and the CA is Monitoring ('PM') and...the CA decides to "take over"! Instead of acting as a mentor, and being a mentor...it just does "NOT COMPUTE"!!

I've been in situations, as a Captain, where I've been able to gently guide a fellow pilot, a sort of 'mentoring'...as I was 'mentored' before. I used what I observed, in order to apply it later.

Not sure if this makes sense to non-pilots? Perhaps there is an analogy in another field that a reader can offer?



preacher1
preacher1 5
This report has probably got a whole bunch of folks scratching their heads and asking why. It looks to me like that if the PF's performance was that bad, that he would have took it over a lot further out than at 400'. That just makes absolutely no sense at all. As far as it not making sense to non-pilots, there has got to be actual HANDS ON TRAINING in any profession, yes even doctors.lol
THRUSTT
THRUSTT 4
I think she panicked because of the "short" runway. She had only been in there twice, that day included, and only as the PNF.
tduggan2010
Tim Duggan 5
"short" runway. Yeah, I've landed at KLGA. Many times. 7,000 feet is "short" when compared to 11,000, but a B737 is NOT a difficult airplane to fly. Heck, decades ago my airline used to operate the A-300-B4 into KLGA. (The A-300...yes, a wide-body. Similar to the A-300-600 that American Airlines, and others, used to operate. Except the B-4 was a 3-person cockpit).
PhotoFinish
PhotoFinish 1
A retired pilot suggests the short runway may have led the captain to pitch down to avoid touching down down the runway and using the length of the runway, specifically might have been trying to avoid crossing the intersection runway which would delay getting back to the gate.

Here's a clip with a new video with a more clear view of the landing, and the retired pilot's comments about the landing.

http://flightaware.com/squawks/view/1/24_hours/new/36073/New_Video_Southwest_345_approach_and_nose_first_landing
preacher1
preacher1 1
Crap, MDW only has 6500 and that is a hub, focus city, whatever, but they are in/out of there many times daily with that same type aircraft.
RRKen
Kenneth Schmidt 1
And they know how to get it stopped at MDW, my legs were wobbly for several days after experiencing the G forces it took.

As far as they eye could see, it was all SWA aircraft at MDW. A plethora!
preacher1
preacher1 2
pretty much except one icy night
TiredTom
Tom Bruce 2
don't forget Burbank...
canuck44
canuck44 3
Hands on yes but two caveats...the hands are already trained to a degree of safety and the trainee follows the algorithm....there are four ways to do it...the right way, the wrong way, the usual way and my way. As long as the last one guides the process, the resident continues to operate. I am hearing "chatter" that this is a SW/AT mixed marriage in the cockpit and that the pilot integration is not as smooth as one might imagine.
preacher1
preacher1 4
I figured that would get a response from you.lol. Keep us posted on anything else your chatter brings out. It is generally more reliable than the official version.
akayemm
Er.A.K. Mittal 0
Yes, on job training for Southwest pilots. But not applicable to Asiana 214 pilots !
Or I am not understanding your message?
preacher1
preacher1 2
Should have applicable on 214 as well, at least that be the intent, but I think that culture got in the way. This is a common practice on any airline or profession. There are some things that cannot be learned until you actually do it.
akayemm
Er.A.K. Mittal 0
Again the same "culture" !
You make it sound and smell like a four letter word.
And definitely not the category of 'love' or 'talk' !! .
JetMech24
JetMech24 2
"Culture" is used as a general term for an atmosphere or environment, in this case, the "culture" of Asiana or other Korean airlines. Form one of your own posts:
"In this back ground how and why the person on the right seat FAILS to notice the birth or genesis of a disaster or a catastrophe? Whether due to error of person on left seat or any other reasons. And nip the bud in the evil , as the saying goes.
And vice-a-versa? Interestingly in same link, 'google' talks of hierarchical aspects of pilot/copilot issues as well ! (cf. both these flights, trainee vs. trainer) I guess BOTH pilots are always equally responsible and guilty in every case. Unless proven otherwise.

It is widely believed that Korean airlines are victim of the "hierarchical" aspects not of pilot/copilot, but seniority. To clarfiy, even if the copilot (less senior, more experienced in the 777) noticed that the pilot (more senior, less experienced in the 777) was screwing up, he is not allowed to tell the pilot "you're doing it wrong". Hope this helps.
JetMech24
JetMech24 1
Was meant to say, ...aspects not "only" of pilot/copilot, but seniority.
akayemm
Er.A.K. Mittal 0
Hierarchical aspects - relating to senior-junior status
JetMech24
JetMech24 1
Correct.
akayemm
Er.A.K. Mittal 0
I am at a total loss of understanding ! Let people die BUT do not correct the wrong doing BECAUSE it is being done by a senior of sorts ! Is the life of this silent by stander not in danger along with that of others ?
I wonder if during class room orientation, the prospective pilots are told of the reasons of emergence of duplicating the entire flying control system.
The basics are clearly stated on 'google' that 'other' fully identical control system is to help in case of emergencies.
Erroneous flying by one pilot is definitely one such emergency.
PhotoFinish
PhotoFinish 2
Now, it seems that you're finally getting the import of the objections of the most experienced pilots here about the cultural implications impacting the cockpit CRM. While in some places, in order to have good cockpit CRM, there has to be a conscious effort to overcome social norms; in the US, have a senior officer be hierarchical at the expense of good CRM is an aberration, that exists but is the exception and not the norm.

That's why you've seen such passion expressed here on the topic. Good cockpit CRM needs to be the norm everywhere. You'll notice that these senior guys on here, will be just as tough on the aberrant US pilots, as they are with foreign pilots who let outside considerations degrade the quality of their cockpit CRM performance as a norm.

Lives are at stake on every flight, each and every time a plane detaches from terra firma. The passengers and crew deserve excellence in flight deck performance every time.
JetMech24
JetMech24 1
That is exactly what it is and why people get all "uptight" and "wound-up" about it.
akayemm
Er.A.K. Mittal 0
Post Script : - Southwest 345 pilots had similar inter personal problem. Right ? So how American culture fits in here ?
tduggan2010
Tim Duggan 1
"SWA 345 pilots had similar inter personal problem. Right?"

No, wrong...if you are attempting to equate Asiana 214.

It is significant that the hierarchical reality of some (Asian) societies is well known, and well documented in numerous examinations of accidents after the fact (and also by what rightly could be considered "hear say", but that still adds to the total "story" to explain otherwise unexplained lapses in safety).

However, it is not correct to compare the above to the modern situation in most Western flight decks. The fact was, though, the over-bearing personality and misplaced deference given to "authority figures" was an issue for many decades. This was slowly recognized, and steps taken to minimize the breakdown in communication that such a climate fostered. Hence, "CRM". And significant reduction in Human factor-driven accidents, compared to historical trends.

Still, key word there is "Human". Fallible, and occasionally egotistical, there can still be lapses in judgement and personal performance. That is the exception, however.


akayemm
Er.A.K. Mittal 1
You remind me of a style of joke whose last line depends whether it is a woman or a man who is responding. A man acts stupid. Woman/women are likely to say " How stupid MEN are". While man/men will say "How stupid the MAN was".
Change it to a woman. And you get the lines laid out. I am sure you get the message.
So much for Asiana 214 pilots vs. SWA 345 pilots .


tduggan2010
Tim Duggan 2
I think you mistake the "point".

ALL men, and ALL women are Human (when discussing Homo Sapien as a species, of course). The perceived 'dichotomy' is culturally driven, and often one's "impressions" and "biases" are fundamentally wrong.

What you just showed was a "Broad Brush" example (no pun intended....words, what a minefield!!) of semantics. And, of incorrect 'generalization'.

Those in the legal profession, no doubt, LOVE semantic plays...or, "Word Plays". (Which is another topic - altogether).
JetMech24
JetMech24 1
No, it's not the culture as it is not the norm, compared to some of the Asian cultures, as Tim explains in his reply. The investigation is still on-going, but it does appear that the "inter personal problem" was at play, not because of the culture, but because of one individual's judgement (the captain). That is, if what we have been hearing is correct.
PhotoFinish
PhotoFinish 1
> "but because of one individual's judgement (the captain)"

But they're both captains!

I assume you mean the PIC, who was the socially junior captain, (PNF) who was sitting in the (co-pilot's) right seat, and was on his very first flight as an instructor on the 777, but with about 3,000 more flying hours than the PF, imcludin over 3,000 hours on type (777).

OTOH, you could mean the PF, who sitting in the left seat (captain's seat) and was socially senior, and as PF was the one actually flying the plane, despite having about 33 hours (or so) on the 777, after spending the last few years in Airbus cockpits flying the A320, including being a flight school instructor for the A320, and having accumulated almost 10,000 total hours flying.

I doubt you mean the third captain, who part of the relief crew, who was comfortably in the cabin, likely in a first class seat, instead of in the cockpit with all the flight crew members, including his own first officer, who was in a jump seat.

Feel free to clarify which captain had such obviously bad judgement.
1) PF who chose the wrong FD mode and failed to link the autothrottles, despite expecting that device to maintain airspeed for him, and had the darkest time trying to keep the plane at the prexy altitude and lined up with the runway.
2) PNF who failed to notice the failures of PF (or at least didn't do anything to correct these by either communicating and teaching, or by intervening and rectifying) or failed to perform his own duty to monitor airspeed and altitude on final approach
3) PNEOTFDDFA (Pilot not even on the flight deck during final approach) which would be company policy and expected of all flight crew members at many other airlines.

Thoughts?

After all that, I realize you probably mean the captain of the Southwest flight who took control of the plane at 400' only to down it nose first, after being too fast and too high already over the threshold.

Never mind.
JetMech24
JetMech24 1
Yeah, I was referring to the SWA one. ;)
tduggan2010
Tim Duggan 1
Ooops...the term is "Pilot Flying", or 'PF'. still, the gist is obvious.
akayemm
Er.A.K. Mittal 0
Dear Friend, about making first comment I have this to say.
A person who submits a squawk must give the first comments. This will reflect the reasons and rationale of selecting and then submitting the particular squawk! I try to do it , always.
On repeat squawk, since this has happened to me a couple of times, here is my observations.
In case of a duplicate squawk, one Ms. Computer declares the squawk being duplicate. If you(the person submitting) still click on 'submit' the submission will appear in the concerned thread as a comment with the stated link under caption 'duplicate squawk' .
So have no worries .
Hope I have not over stepped or exceeded my rights or jurisdiction ?
tduggan2010
Tim Duggan 2
I wish to add...we are speculating BEFORE all of the facts are in.

Based ONLY on my experience as a line pilot for a major U.S. airline, to include PIC time in the B737 (Also typed in the DC9 and B757/767) I just scratch my head, sometimes.

I've been a 'mentor' in the cockpit, countless times.
gearup328
Peter Steitz 1
You're right, Tim. I have started talking to my FO when he/she is not flying as I think he/she should, could. I read that SWA had an 11Kt tailwind on the approach when the surface was virtually calm. Windshear? Either they were not talking on the way down or something radically occurred at 400 feet. At a 3 degree GS, (300 feet per NM), they were just over a mile from touchdown. At 140KTS, that's about 30 seconds from touchdown----to do what? Dive down and hit nowsewheel first? Just Monday morning quarterbacking. We need to read the CVR.

[This poster has been suspended.]

CaptainFreedom
CaptainFreedom 2
Once again, Mr Rudd is hanging the 'kick me' sign on himself. I'm sure that someone in this thread will take the bait.

[This poster has been suspended.]

btweston
btweston 1
Not really. It's not terribly offensive either... But it isn't really that funny. Humor usually involves some sort of irony. You're just going "Ha ha, look at what I just said."
THRUSTT
THRUSTT -1
C'mon, give him a thumbs up, the old guy was funny!!!
THRUSTT
THRUSTT 1
Affirmative action at it's best. NDB approach down to mins. using the needle only with a stiff crosswind in the interview is what's needed. Not these bullshit TMAT questions and graduates from these jet bridge programs with the 1000 hour wonders from Riddle and ATP!!!
tduggan2010
Tim Duggan 2
"THRUSTT"....lol!! I know what you mean. Ya know something? Even at my airline (I'm retired now) we used to do NDB circling approaches in the simulator, because, well sometimes this happened in real life. But around the late 1990s 'they' decided to stop training circling approaches. NDB, VOR, you name it. Maybe because of technological advancements?

GPS-enhanced FMS pretty much negates much of what we needed to learn to get an Instrument Rating, back in the day. However, those skills (flying an NDB approach, etc) are paramount in honing the type of mindset that leads to better pilots.

I'm beginning to sound like a dinosaur....ugh.
preacher1
preacher1 4
Well, it's kinda like school. A teenage girl witness at the Zimmerman trial said she couldn't read cursive writing. An education guy somewhere said there was no longer a need to teach it or multiplication tables as all were using computers and calculators now. That is all well and good but that crap will break sooner or later and life will keep on going. I'll use every bit of automation in a cockpit to make life easier (Tim: we don't have to hand crank engines anymore.lol)but I will know how to get down safely if something burps.
canuck44
canuck44 4
...as in "forget the monitors, examine the patient!"
gearup328
Peter Steitz 1
Thrustt,you got it. When I started commercial flying (after Air Force) is when I actually learned to fly. NDB, circling, back course, etc. Flying single seat fighters, we NEVER did those. Radar vectors to final or visual overhead with a pitchout.
preacher1
preacher1 1
Well, the initial word on the street is that the Captain was a female, Nazi type check airman, and that things weren't too sweet in the cockpit. I guess we'll see.LOL
tduggan2010
Tim Duggan 2
preacher...oh, OK. I really, really hate to allow sexism (or racism, or ANY other "ism")in to cloud my judgement. However, when you wrote "Nazi type check airman" I just had to laugh, because IF that is the case, then it begins to make sense.

Pilots are highly trained of course, but in the final analysis we are still only Human, after all. We bring with us all of our own faults and foibles.

As to the Check Airman aspect? One only has to look at the tragic AAL (American Airlines) Flight 1420 disaster at Little Rock, AR, 1 June, 1999.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/American_Airlines_Flight_1420

NTSB video reconstruction from the FDR:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VG-5SGTgZuY

I expect that there will be, in about a year or so, an NTSB video about SWA 345.
gearup328
Peter Steitz 2
Ah, 1420. I use this as an example in classes.
AABABY
AABABY 1
pilotworkshops.com just did an article pertaining to the 1420 incident this morning.
AABABY
AABABY 1
Interesting that the http://www.PilotWorkshops.com website with Mark Robidoux just did an article on that today. It was titled "Deadly IFR Trap" They used a hypothetical scenario to illustrate the issue and his guest, Wally Moran explained that the 1420 incident was the basis for the lesson. I trust Mr. Robidoux will not object to my posting this link
<http://www.pilotworkshop.com/scenario/ifrtrap/video>
preacher1
preacher1 1
Well, I lost some good friends on that flight, and there is even a full corner in downtown Russellville as a memorial to them. that said, I saw the reconstruction and have read the reports many times over. While crappy wx and contaminated runway, I think he was doing good slipping in between 2 systems and if he had deployed those spoilers he probably would have been OK. Reasons, only guesswork really.
tduggan2010
Tim Duggan 1
preacher, I am sorry to hear that you lost any friends in the AAL 1420 accident,

Still, and that accident and this one don't really mesh....I used the AAL 1420 as a reference to point out that a "Check Airman" status does not automatically infer "good" upon a pilot.

While it is true that many Check Airman pilots at a given company exist, SOME may fly often, whilst SOME may sit behind a desk, mostly...keep in mind that ALL "Management Pilots" bave to fly only the minimum required in order to stay current.
preacher1
preacher1 2
That last part was the same way the USAF was and may still be; Desk Jockeys had to fly 4 hours a month to stay on flight status and draw that money. I know that "CHECK AIRMAN" doesn't make you a better pilot. CHECK AIRMAN is just designated by the company to perform those proficiency checks and hopefully they are qualified to do that. That title and 1.00 might buy you a cup of coffee somewhere. lol.
gearup328
Peter Steitz 1
At my last un named company, check airman were usually former FO's who took the bait and immediately went to the left seat as a check airman. The company could then "train" them like little soldiers. Us older, more experienced guys were ignored.
tduggan2010
Tim Duggan 1
gearup328....RE: "check airman" pilots....I am with you 100% on that.

We line pilots used to make fun of the "Office Jockeys". I am sure that this is sometimes the case. NOT all "management pilots" are crap, but...in my experience, some of them are. The ones who "toady" into the "management" ranks? Well, they usually stand out.....
preacher1
preacher1 1
Also, see John Donaldson's comment up above here.
joelwiley
joel wiley 1
Don't do CPR just cuz the lead fell off.
mdlacey
Matt Lacey 1
Ugh. Pray that's not what makes it into the final report. The Labor and Justice departments will start demanding some sort of compliance and annual re-education for ATPs.
HGreen
Herb Green 1
As far as whether the Captain of the flight was a female--the initial ATC call-in to the Tower was a female so we can probably say she was the pilot not flying at the time. So, since the Huffington article said of the copilot, "he's logged about ___ hours . . ., we can easily deduce that the Captain was a female who took over the controls for the landing.
tommymac
Thomas McCarthy 1
should've just gone around
THRUSTT
THRUSTT 1
It seems like a different mindset at SWA. Around April in PBI, I was no. behind a Slowtation holding short of 28L at PBI. There was another guy lining up waiting and an SWA on final. Pretty busy morning and the Tower dude had his hands full. The aircraft on the runway was cleared to go but SWA was too close now, and told to go around, he was given a heading and altitude. The Slowtation was put on the runway to wait, about 30 secs. later he came back on the freq. with slightly vulgar language in a loud tone asking what they were going to do with him. The aircraft on the runway was then cleared to go, but he didn't go anywhere and the Tower controller became silent for a few secs. That SWA idiot rattled 2 guys , the pilot and the controller!!!
THRUSTT
THRUSTT 1
Lemme clear that up, the way I wrote it, it seems like the Citation guy was the one with the language, it was the SWA guy...
THRUSTT
THRUSTT 1
Damn, I need to proofread before I post, should be 28R, and I was no.2 behind the Citation...
tduggan2010
Tim Duggan 1
"SlowTation"....LOL!!

Perfect. ATC call them that, so I'm told.
tduggan2010
Tim Duggan 1
Oops..."learning" tool....keyboard error...
btweston
btweston 1
What I'm about to say is certainly unscientific and possibly unfounded, but I've been reading on several aviation forums that Southwest pilots are known for companywide culture of "get-there-itis" due to their reliance on quick turnarounds in order to maximize airframe utilization. This has led, from what I understand, to some rougher than usual landings from time to time and, *perhaps* a nose dive at La Guardia.

This sounds absolutely insane to me, but is it possible?
PhotoFinish
PhotoFinish 1
That's what some people are saying in forums. Not sure if true or not.

In this situation they were behind schedule because of weather related delays in crowded airspace at an airport that becomes severly capacity constrained in adverse weather conditions.

There may have been some pressure to get down.
tduggan2010
Tim Duggan 1
Ditto (^ ^ ^ )
btweston
btweston 1
Safety first... Unless someone's money is on the line, I guess.

It's truly remarkable how much people preach doing things the right way, in aviation and every other line of work, but when it comes down to it they just want you do get it done. And we're all shocked... SHOCKED!... when something bad happens.
gearup328
Peter Steitz 1
Yea, and if taxi is defined as a brisk walk, then the SWA crews never heard of it.
treehouse4rent
Carlos Bea 1
Wouldn't it just have been safer to call "Go around" then?
akayemm
Er.A.K. Mittal 0
Friends(all expert fliers), as a student of management backed by engineering I am at a loss of understanding about the conduct of BOTH pilots in this Southwest 345 case as well as that of Asiana 214.
As per google ( http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/First_officer_(civil_aviation) ) the tasks of copilot(right seat) are as follows amongs many other :-

..... " In commercial aviation, the first officer is the second pilot (sometimes referred to as the "co-pilot") of an aircraft. The first officer is second-in-command of the aircraft, to the captain who is the legal commander. In the event of incapacitation of the captain, the first officer will assume command of the aircraft.
Control of the aircraft is normally shared equally between the first officer and the captain, with one pilot normally designated the "pilot flying" (PF) and the other the "pilot not flying" (PNF), or "pilot monitoring" (PM), for each flight. Even when the first officer is the flying pilot, however, the captain remains ultimately responsible for the aircraft, its passengers, and the crew. In typical day-to-day operations, the essential job tasks remain fairly equal." ......

In this back ground how and why the person on the right seat FAILS to notice the birth or genesis of a disaster or a catastrophe? Whether due to error of person on left seat or any other reasons. And nip the bud in the evil , as the saying goes.
And vice-a-versa?
Interestingly in same link, 'google' talks of hierarchical aspects of pilot/copilot issues as well ! (cf. both these flights, trainee vs. trainer)
I guess BOTH pilots are always equally responsible and guilty in every case. Unless proven otherwise.

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