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NTSB releases Asiana 214 CVR Transcript
PDF of the transcript of the cockpit voice recorder for Asiana 214 (dms.ntsb.gov) Daha Fazlası...Sort type: [Top] [Newest]
Can you imagine the SFO tower on a balmy, beautiful day watching an aircraft sink below the GP and crash into the approach end of the runway? Must have been a dream awakening. I don't care what all of you post here----pilots need to "fly the airplane". Automation is great but when it comes to eyeballs--we need real pilots. The airplane will fly just right if you guide it.
Seeing their distance and the fact that depth perception, they probably knew they were close, but thought the crew knew what they were doing until parts started flying off the plane. Nothing the tower could have or should have done. All on the crew on this one.
We know from research back in the 70s that pilots make more errors as stress increases. Reports on the Asiana accident indicate that you had two newbies at the controls: the Captain/pilot flying, who was new to the equipment, and the pilot monitoring/PIC, who was in his first run as an instructor, commanding from the right seat.
The PF told investigators he was feeling a lot of stress, presumably because he wasn’t yet fully comfortable with the plane, didn’t have much experience landing it, and felt some additional pressure from the need to make a visual approach with the glide slope out.
A key question is whether the check pilot (PM) didn’t see trouble coming, or did see it but didn’t know what to do. Could he have been afraid of making a bad situation worse by adding more stress to the PF? It was his first run in an instructor role, and the first time he and the PF had flown together. All that might help to explain why a PM who was active and chatty before things started to heat up got so quiet during a critical phase of flight.
I haven’t heard the CVR, but I’m guessing the relief pilot in the jump seat was concerned but very polite when he said , “Sink rate, sir” about 50 seconds before impact. The PF acknowledged that input, but the relief pilot repeated it five seconds later, and maybe a third time. (The source isn’t identified on the third one.) So the pilots got a gentle hint from a back seat driver that maybe they were descending too fast, but for the next 40 seconds or so, all we hear from them is routine calls. The first indication that the PM might be concerned is his comment 23 seconds before impact, “It’s low.” The PF responded, “Yeah.” Not until 8 seconds to impact does the PM comment on speed, and he only issued his go-around call at 30 feet and after the stick shaker warning.
So this may be a classic CRM accident, reminiscent of Eastern’s 1011 at MIA where everyone’s attention was riveted on a nose gear light. You’ve got a PF whose bandwidth is severely narrowed by the stress he was feeling, and a PM who was either out of the loop, or so focused on trying to figure out how to be a good coach that he forgot he was in command of the airplane.
The PF told investigators he was feeling a lot of stress, presumably because he wasn’t yet fully comfortable with the plane, didn’t have much experience landing it, and felt some additional pressure from the need to make a visual approach with the glide slope out.
A key question is whether the check pilot (PM) didn’t see trouble coming, or did see it but didn’t know what to do. Could he have been afraid of making a bad situation worse by adding more stress to the PF? It was his first run in an instructor role, and the first time he and the PF had flown together. All that might help to explain why a PM who was active and chatty before things started to heat up got so quiet during a critical phase of flight.
I haven’t heard the CVR, but I’m guessing the relief pilot in the jump seat was concerned but very polite when he said , “Sink rate, sir” about 50 seconds before impact. The PF acknowledged that input, but the relief pilot repeated it five seconds later, and maybe a third time. (The source isn’t identified on the third one.) So the pilots got a gentle hint from a back seat driver that maybe they were descending too fast, but for the next 40 seconds or so, all we hear from them is routine calls. The first indication that the PM might be concerned is his comment 23 seconds before impact, “It’s low.” The PF responded, “Yeah.” Not until 8 seconds to impact does the PM comment on speed, and he only issued his go-around call at 30 feet and after the stick shaker warning.
So this may be a classic CRM accident, reminiscent of Eastern’s 1011 at MIA where everyone’s attention was riveted on a nose gear light. You’ve got a PF whose bandwidth is severely narrowed by the stress he was feeling, and a PM who was either out of the loop, or so focused on trying to figure out how to be a good coach that he forgot he was in command of the airplane.
Look, guys a 3 degree GS is 3,000 feet AGL at 10 miles. This aircraft had a radar altimeter. They were over open water--the bay. At 3 miles, they should have about 900 feet AGL. One mile and 300 feet AGL. Glide slope or not. This is just not professional piloting. I'll say it again----FLY THE AIRPLANE.
You are correct... the Radio Altimeter should have given them at least part of a clue they were too low... I mean really... On the EGPWS... What do they think the phrase "TOO LOW! PULL UP! TOO LOW! PULL UP!" means... That was heard on the CVR... Of course.... The captain did decide to call Go Around (1st right decision so far, about 30 seconds too late).
Was this transcript edited? It seems rather sparse and just hit the 'highlights'.
Routine checklist comments unposted?
Am curious in view of the interview transcripts.
Routine checklist comments unposted?
Am curious in view of the interview transcripts.