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FAA disregarded security flaws during the certification of Boeing 737 MAX, sources claim
According to the Seattle Times, FAA managers forced their employees working on the aircraft's certification to delegate a wide of range of their responsibilities to Boeing itself for the safety assessment 737 MAXs. (airlinerwatch.com) Daha Fazlası...Sort type: [Top] [Newest]
[This poster has been suspended.]
[This poster has been suspended.]
The "thumb" has lost it's stature with me since the doors opened here. Once, it was about the post, now it's about the poster. Not surprisingly I didn't win too many popularity contests, but it didn't keep me from findin the airport.
Interesting to read the this MCAS system apparently resets every time the pilot pulls against it? Another article states that a one or two hour ipad course on system differentials was given to crews. I wonder if anyone ever brought up the question of sensor failure causing MCAS activation ( other than the QRH Stab Trim Switches) and if the fault was programmable into the simulator?
HF, the fact that these two events occurred immediately after takeoff obviously adds to the equation, but how many real problems did they throw at you at 350 in the sim. Most are on takeoff or arrival, and while none of the speculation is settled fact, I would ask, how would reacting to a stab trim runaway not be in the cards even without Boeings stupid ommissions? I contend that they spend all their time in the sim. now learning how to use the automation, not how to fly the airplane with what's left when it fails.
True enough. I was just speculating as to a what if, because some 737 driver somewhere, should have asked the question having just learned and read about MCAS on the differences course can we simulate it? We had the type of issue with the Pitch Trim Compensator on the stretch DC-8. If the crews were new or very low time I would expect some ambiguity, but high time experienced B737 pilots should have been asking the questions? You are quite right on the training/ automation front!
So now we have an airplane with bigger, heavier more powerful motors mounted further forward from the CG. A full power stall recovery would now create a much more exaggerated pitch up response than the original airplane displayed. And for the same reasons, an idle power stall would have an exaggerated nose down pitching moment and seemingly a lesser problem as the natural tendency. Until you pushed max power to recover and went into a very high AOA accelerated stall. Hence MCAS? It fits. The Boeing test pilots know and we will too when it all comes out in court.
I agree with your and Highflyer's assessments entirely and will add another point. With a system that can have such control of the stab, it is unbelievable that any engineer or pilot would design it to operate off a single source with no failsafe particularly when another system is on the other side of the airframe.
All correct,
https://www.faa.gov/other_visit/aviation_industry/designees_delegations/individual_designees/der/